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1. Introduction
Recent literature pays a lot of attention to the theoretical relation between investment and
uncertainty. The traditional criterion for making investment decisions is the Net Present
Value (NPV) rule. If the NPV of a project is positive, it should be undertaken; otherwise,
the firm will never implement this project. It is in principle a static decision and there is
no timing flexibility of investment. Correspondingly, the optimal neoclassical investment
rule is: the marginal revenue of capital equals the marginal cost of capital () MC MR = .
The real options theory of investment assumes that a firm holds call options on the
sequence of net returns that is expected to be generated from the investment project
(McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). According to the real options
theory of investment the option value of the investment opportunity should be a
component of the marginal revenue of capital, although the general rule () MC MR =
does not change. The intuition is that once the firm decides to invest right away, the
opportunity of obtaining more information about uncertain variables is lost. It is
equivalent to the situation that the firm gives up the right to improve the outcome if
necessary. This right is valuable since revising investment decisions is costly.
There are two key assumptions of the real options theory of investment. On the one
hand, investment decisions are irreversible.
1 On the other hand, there is timing flexibility
of investment. Imperfect competition in product markets or monopoly power is often
regarded as the source of timing flexibility of investment decisions. The assumption of
irreversibility guarantees the option value to be operative. If the firm can reverse its
investment decisions at zero cost and at any time it likes, even with the presence of
uncertainty, the delay of investment and the corresponding option are not valuable.
However, irreversibility is not always a sufficient condition for a positive option value or
equivalently a negative uncertainty effect on investment. Caballerro (1991) proves that
only if irreversibility is combined with imperfect competition or decreasing returns to
scale or both, uncertainty affects investment negatively.
2 Following Dixit and Pindyck
(1994), it can be shown that the second moments of stochastic variables relevant to the
investment decision increase the threshold that triggers investment. Therefore the basic
prediction of the real options theory of investment is that uncertainty depresses
investment through the threshold effect. Besides this basic prediction, Abel and Eberly3
(1999) document that irreversibility may increase the long-run capital stock of the firm
due to a hangover effect. Bar-Ilan and Strange (1999) propose that the positive option
value may have a positive effect on investment if the intensity of investment is taken into
account. To summarize, there is no a clear-cut theoretical prediction with respect to the
impact of irreversibility and option values on investment, which implies that the
investment-uncertainty relationship relies more heavily on empirical tests.
There are a few empirical papers that construct the investment threshold and test the
effect of uncertainty on investment. Pattillo (1998) tests the threshold effect on
investment for manufacturing firms in Ghana using survey data. She estimates the
investment threshold in a reduced form equation in which the investment trigger is a
function of both demand uncertainty and the cost of capital variables. Caballero and
Pindyck (1996) and Pindyck and Solimano (1993) calculate the investment threshold by
the extreme value of the marginal profitability of capital. They regress the computed
threshold on the drift and the standard deviation of the marginal profitability of capital (as
a measure of uncertainty) to test the effect of uncertainty on the threshold and on
investment. Although the idea of these empirical papers is based on the real options
theory of investment, i.e. uncertainty directly increases the investment threshold and
through the threshold it depresses investment, estimating the threshold within the
structure of the real options model of investment is scarce. In this paper, we follow a
standard real options model of investment (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) to construct the
threshold value of profits that triggers firm investment. Dutch firm-level panel data is
applied to test the predictions of the real options model. We test whether firms wait to
invest due to the consideration of opportunity costs of exercising investment options.
Moreover, we present an illustration of the role played by irreversibility in causing firms
to wait to invest. Asset liquidity and the speed of depreciation of capital goods are
employed as indirect proxies for irreversibility to test the association between the delay of
investment and the restriction of irreversibility.
Using an unbalanced panel of 77 listed Dutch manufacturing firms during 1984-
1997, we find that the sample firms are on average concerned with the option values of
investment opportunities in making investment decisions. They intend to wait until the
actual profit hits its threshold value. This result confirms the basic prediction of the real
options theory of investment. It is natural to explain this result by examining the main
assumptions of the standard real options theory of investment. Therefore we investigate4
irreversibility and monopolistic competition issues. The association between our proxies
for irreversibility and the delay of investment is not supported by the data. There is no
convincing evidence that the restriction of irreversibility, as measured by liquid ratio and
the speed of depreciation, is an important concern when firms postpone investment. This
implies that probably we need better information on for instance the reselling prices of
capital goods to proxy for irreversibility. Moreover, if irreversibility is not an effective
factor that drives firms to wait to invest, then the existence of waiting behaviour suggests
that the sample firms enjoy timing flexibility in arranging their investment. Timing
flexibility allows the sample firms to set higher investment hurdles. This result can be
explained by the fact that most of the sample firms are large multinational corporations in
the Dutch economy, they are in general monopolistic competitors either on a world scale
or in domestic industries. We indeed find evidence that market power is associated with
severer waiting effects for the sample firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we briefly present a
standard real options model of investment. Section 3 discusses practical issues. Section 4
explains the choice of proxies for irreversibility. Evidence is discussed in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes.
2.  A real options model of  investment
In this section, we briefly present a standard real options model of investment based on
Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
3 The full derivation of the model is presented in Appendix A.
A risk-averse firm decides whether to start a new capital investment project in the current
year. Suppose that the value of the firm is the expected discounted value of future profits
that is generated by the investment project. Profits are stochastic due to uncertain
operating conditions. The profit process follows a geometric Brownian motion. The
threshold value of profits is given by:














































where  b  is the positive root of the quadratic equation that is a solution to the
characteristic function of the Bellman equation that defines the value of the investment
project. 
2 , p p s m  are the drift and the variance of the profit process.  r  is the risk-adjusted
discount rate of the firm. IC denotes the investment cost. Equation (1) gives the threshold
level of profit 
* p . 
1 - b
b
is the so called ‘option value multiplier’.  Dixit and Pindyck
(1994) prove that  1 > b  as long as the risk-adjusted discount rate r   is greater than the
drift of the stochastic variable  p m .
4  Notice that it is the option value multiplier
1 - b
b
that makes the distinction between the real options theory of investment and the




on the distribution of the stochastic variable of concern, it introduces the second moment
of the stochastic variable (volatility) into the investment decision. On the right hand of
(1), () p m r - is the convenience yield.




 is the discounted critical
value of profits. According to the neoclassical investment theory (equivalently the NPV
rule) the project is undertaken if the expected discounted return from investment is not
smaller than the investment cost.  In the view of the real options theory of investment, the






, which implies that a higher expected return is required to compensate
the possible loss due to uncertainty. As a consequence, the possible delay of investment
makes fewer projects accepted as compared to the acceptable projects based on the NPV
rule.6
The definition of b (equation (2)) shows that the option value multiplier depends on
the distribution of the stochastic variable of concern and the risk-adjusted discount rate of
the firm. Therefore the problem of approximating the threshold value that triggers
investment is in fact reduced to finding a way to model the expected distribution of the
stochastic process. Under certain assumptions, the discount rate can be computed.
Therefore all variables can be identified in equation (1) as long as we can find a way to
model the future development of the profit process. In empirical analyses, we first
construct b  based on the information on the historical distribution of profits and the firm




constructed. Next we set up the series of the threshold value of profits (
* p ) based on
equation (1) for each firm. It is specially interesting whether the difference between the
actual value and the constructed threshold value of profits is able to explain firm
investment. As we know that under the traditional investment rule (the NPV rule) this
difference should not matter for firm investment.
3. Empirical Issues
3.1 Data
The data covers an unbalanced panel of 77 Dutch manufacturing firms during 1984-1997.
These firms are all listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchanges (AEX). The quoted firms
are relatively big in size. Many of the sample firms can be considered to be monopolistic
competitors on a world scale. Due to its historical roots, a majority of the Dutch listed
firms are internationally oriented. The domestic firms in the sample are also relatively
large as compared to the average firm size in the industry. As stated before in the standard
real options model of investment, timing flexibility with respect to when to undertake
investment mainly results from imperfect competition in product markets. Even with the
delay of investment, the monopoly power of the firm can prevent other firms from
entering the industry. In case that the entry happens, monopoly power can reduce the loss
so that the benefit of waiting may be still attractive. The monopoly power enjoyed by the
sample firms enables us to apply the data to the standard real options model of
investment.7
Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for some selected variables. It shows that profits
fluctuate a lot. The value of the standard deviation of profits is about 3.5 times its mean
value. The distribution of gross investment is dispersed, the standard deviation of
investment is about 3.3 times its mean value.
Table 1  Descriptive Statistics
(unit: 10
6 Guilders)
Mean Maximum Minimum Std.Dev. Obs.
Gross Investment 271.76 9499 -1718 888.96 754
Capital Stock 1664.89 44723 1.06 5301.31 754
Profit 225.06 10936 -76 778.56 754
Sales Growth 0.1163 4.2612 -0.5214 0.2838 754
Payout Ratio 0.4331 11.522 0 49.6808 754
Depreciation Rate 0.1709 0.7702 0.0094 0.0788 754
Liquidity Ratio 0.4619 17.5769 0 1.3442 754
Option Multiple 11.0067 735.09 1.0554 50.62 754
Profit Threshold 317.76 16040.39 -14508.99 1454.23 754
(1) Data source: Jaarboek van Nederlands Ondernemingen
The data required to construct the threshold value of profits consist of the drift and the
variance of the profit process, the risk-adjusted discount rate of the firm, and investment
costs. Gross investment expenditures in each year are observable for each firm and are
used to approximate the total direct investment outlay for that year. As far as the drift and
the variance of profits are concerned, they should be forward-looking. When making
irreversible investment decisions, the firm assigns subjective probabilities on the future
development of profits, based on which the firm decides whether or not to postpone
investment. By assuming that the objective distribution of profits exists, historical data8
can be employed to model the firm’s expectations on the future development of profits.
Using historical data to construct the proxy for expected movement of stochastic variables
is now a quite standard approach in empirical literature on the effect of uncertainty on
investment (see for instance Ghosal and Loungani, 1996, 2000). Modeling the expected
distribution of profits with a relatively short time series (14 years in our dataset) is not an
easy task. However, we take into account all historical information about the movement
of profits available to the firm. It is assumed that every year firms update their
expectations on the future development of profits using the whole historical track of the
profit process. More specifically, we calculate the drift of profits for the current year by
taking the average of the growth rate of profits over the whole sample period in the past.
For example, in 1987, the drift is approximated by the average of the growth rate using
the 1985, 1986, and 1987 information;
6 for the year 1988, the drift is computed based on
the growth rates for the years 1985 to 1988 etc. In the similar way we calculate the
variance of the profit process for the current year by taking the variance of the growth rate
of profits over the whole past sample period.
The risk-adjusted discount rate needs more caution. In the standard real options model
of investment (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) it is often assumed that capital markets are
sufficiently complete. With this assumption, stochastic changes in the value of the firm
are spanned by existing assets in the economy, therefore the assumptions about risk
preferences or discount rates are not relevant for making investment decisions. Without
the spanning assumption (where the dynamic programming approach applies), all equity
financing of investment is assumed. If the firm is assumed to be risk-neutral, the discount
rate is just the risk-free interest rate. When risk-aversion is assumed, the convenience
yield equals the dividend ratio paid by the underlying asset (for example, the investment
project). Therefore the risk-adjusted discount rate of the firm is the sum of the average
growth rate of the asset and the dividend ratio paid by the asset. Using the symbols of our
model:  d m r p + = , where d is the payout ratio of the firm. Therefore in the standard
real options model of investment without the spanning assumption, a risk-averse firm
discounts the investment opportunity partially due to the fact that the asset itself grows
and partially because of the convenience yield by simply holding the dividend-paying
asset.9
Based on the above information, the option multiplier 
1 - b
b
 is constructed for each
firm each year, the threshold value of profits is then constructed according to the
structure of the model (equation (1)).
7 The last two rows of Table 1 present the
distributions of the constructed option multiplier and the threshold value of profits. As
we can see, the mean value of the constructed option value multiplier is 11.01 with the
standard deviation of 50.62. The value of the computed threshold for profits is on
average larger than the mean value of the observed profits. These statistics suggest that
there are indeed some firms whose actual values of profits are below the threshold
values. These firms will wait until the actual value of profits hits its threshold level
according to the real options theory of investment. In addition, we do observe that the
option value multiplier varies a lot across firms, which indicates that the option value
multiplier is firm-specific and the impact of the option value on investment depends on
firm-specific characteristics. Not surprisingly, the threshold level of profits that triggers
investment varies obviously across firms and over time.
3.2 Empirical Specification
The purpose of the paper is twofold. On the one hand we are interested in whether the
sample firms intend to wait due to the consideration of the option values of investment
opportunities. On the other hand we are interested in whether irreversibility or monopoly
power plays a role in causing firms to postpone investment.
To test the waiting effect, a new variable ‘wait’ is defined as the difference between
the observed value and the threshold value of profits. The reduced investment model we
estimate reads:












where  t i f f , are firm and time effects.  it it K I ,  represents gross investment and the
capital stock of firm i at time t .  1 a  is the parameter to be estimated.  it e  is the error term.
We use a reduced form linear investment equation to check the waiting effect. In all
estimations, the variable ‘wait’ is scaled by the capital stock to eliminate size effects. The10
estimated coefficient of ‘wait’ is expected to be significant with a negative sign if the firm
experiences waiting behavior. The intuition is that the interesting case for the subject
matter of this study is when the actual profit is below the threshold value of profit. In this
case the bigger the difference between the actual profit and its threshold, the severer the
waiting behavior as predicted by the standard real options model of investment. This
implies a lower investment ratio.
To test the association between the restriction of irreversibility and the delay of
investment, we interact the variable ‘wait’ with proxies for irreversibility in estimating the
reduced investment model:
it it it it it t i
it
e proxy proxy wait wait f f
K
I






3 2 1 * a a a (4)
where  2 a  represents the effect of irreversibility on investment which works via ‘wait’.
proxy  indicates the proxy for irreversibility.  it e  is the error term. As to be discussed in
the next section we will select two indicators for irreversibility, namely asset liquidity and
the rate of depreciation of capital goods for each firm. In estimating (4), we isolate the
own effect of ‘wait’ and the own effect of irreversibility by adding ‘wait’ and the proxy
for irreversibility separately into the investment equation. Since the dependent variable is
the ratio of gross investment to the capital stock, one could argue that the own effect of
depreciation is already carried by firm fixed effects. Therefore there is no need to control
the own effect of depreciation in estimating equation (4). Due to the above concern, in
section 5 we report the results for both cases when the own effect of depreciation is
controlled and when it is not controlled. Once again in all estimations, ‘wait’ is scaled by
the capital stock. Since both proxies for irreversibility are ratios, they are not scaled by
the capital stock. In estimating equation (4) special attention is paid to whether the
estimated coefficient of the interactive term  2 a  is significant.11
3.3 Estimation Method
The profit threshold is a constructed proxy for the investment trigger that is by nature
unobservable. This implies that the variable ‘wait’ suffers from measurement errors. In
addition, ‘wait’ is obviously an endogenous variable, it correlates with the error term in
the investment equation on the one hand and with firm fixed effects on the other. Under
these circumstances we choose the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to estimate
the effect of ‘wait’ on investment. 
In principle we can run the GMM estimation in first differences by assuming no serial
correlation of the error term. However, first difference GMM estimators may suffer from
weak instruments problem in some cases. Blundell and Bond (1998) prove that for a
dynamic panel data model, the standard GMM estimator is biased either when the lagged
dependent variable is highly correlated with the current dependent variable or when
heteroskedascity is high across cross-section units. For firm-level investment analyses,
we expect high heteroskedasticity across firms due to the fact that there are so many
endogenous factors that interact with each other in affecting the response of firm
investment to uncertainty. Not all relevant variables are reflected by the variable ‘wait’.
These missing effects are expected to be carried by the error term of the investment
model. As the consequence we adopt the system GMM estimation procedure proposed
by Blundell and Bond (1998), in which moment conditions for equations in first
differences are combined with moment conditions for equations in levels to compute the
optimal weighting matrix that provides consistent system GMM estimators.
4. Proxies for irreversibility
As mentioned earlier, one of the key assumptions of the real options theory of investment
is irreversibility. However, the impact of irreversibility on investment is debated  (see the
introduction). Therefore it is natural to pick up some indicators that may reveal some
information on the restriction of irreversibility faced by the firm in order to test whether
irreversibility alone is an important factor that forces firms to wait to invest.
The wedge between purchasing and reselling prices of capital goods may result from
either the fact that capital goods are firm-or industry-specific or from the notion that
secondary markets for capital goods are missing or that those markets are not efficient
(Pindyck, 1991). It may also arise due to the asymmetric information (lemons) problem.
In the literature some empirical proxies of irreversibility are proposed. Guiso and Parigi12
(1999) use two different indicators of irreversibility: (i) the degree of access to secondary
markets for installed capital goods; (ii) the degree of the cyclical volatility of the firm’s
industry. The intuition behind the second proxy is that the more cyclical the industry is,
the more illiquid the firm’s capital might be. Pattillo (1998) uses as a proxy for
irreversibility the ratio of real sales to replacement value of the capital stock. Bell and
Campa (1997) split investment projects (on chemical products) by the type of investment:
greenfield investment versus capacity expansions. Greenfield plants involve a greater
amount of sunk costs than investment in capacity expansions. Therefore the degree of
irreversibility in greenfield plants is higher than that in capacity expansion. In Pindyck
(1986), the proxy for irreversibility is the physical property embedded in aggregate capital
goods. The investment in structures is more irreversible as compared to the investment in
equipment. Unfortunately, the information on purchasing and reselling prices of capital
goods and that on the access to the secondary capital goods markets are not available for
our sample. The data restricts us to choose some indirect variables that are expected to
reveal some information on the restriction of irreversibility faced by the firm.
First we use asset liquidity as the proxy for the restriction of irreversibility. In the
corporate finance literature, the transaction costs model predicts that if a large fraction of
the assets owned by the firm is liquid, the firm owns more firm-specific assets (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1993), implying a severer restriction of irreversibility. The intuition is that if
the firm owns more non-specific assets, it is easier for the firm to resell assets in the
secondary capital goods markets to raise funds with lower transaction costs, then a higher
level of liquid assets is not necessarily held by the firm because holding liquid assets is
also costly. One of the reasons of holding liquid assets is due to its buffer effect as pointed
out by Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999). Since the firm saves transaction
costs in raising funds by holding liquid assets, the firm can avoid going to the secondary
capital goods markets very often to liquidate its fixed assets to make payments. Therefore
holding a higher level of liquid assets suggests that the firm is likely to have more
difficulties in reselling capital goods and then is expected to face more restrictions of
irreversibility. Hence the liquidity ratio may reveal some information on the restriction of
irreversibility. We calculate the liquidity ratio for each firm using the value of liquid
assets to the value of the capital stock. We expect that the higher the liquidity ratio, the
severer the restriction of irreversibility and the larger the waiting effect of investment. In
other words, the interaction between asset liquidity and ‘wait’ is expected to be positive.13
The second proxy for irreversibility is the speed of depreciation of capital goods.
Depreciation includes physical deterioration and the efficiency decline of capital goods
with the passage of time. The speed of economic depreciation of capital goods reveals the
speed of technology development and the changes in economic conditions. It is related to
the shadow value of existing capital goods. If we assume that there are secondary markets
for capital goods, the reselling prices of capital goods should be set based on the book or
the market value of assets, while depreciation provides the information on how much
value has been deducted from the book value of assets. Therefore the higher the rate of
depreciation of capital goods, the quicker the recovery of the sunk cost of investment and
the less concern for the possible loss resulted from reselling capital goods in secondary
markets. Therefore we expect that the interaction between the depreciation policy and
‘wait’, if any, is negative. Chirinko (1996) claims that accelerating depreciation may wash
off the constraints created by irreversibility. Pindyck (1988) also mentions that if capital
becomes obsolete rapidly, the opportunity cost of investing will be small. Ghosal (1995)
in a study of the impact of price uncertainty on industry output concentration uses
depreciation to proxy for sunk costs, claiming that speedy depreciation lowers sunk costs.
5. Empirical Results
5.1 Main Tests
The system GMM estimation is conducted by using the package of DPD98 for Gauss
(Arellano and Bond, 1998). The instruments are chosen based on the principle that the
information on the right–hand side variables is used as much as possible until the valid
lowest value of Sargan statistic is obtained. Time dummies from 1984 to 1997 are added
in all estimations and therefore used as additional instruments. The results of estimating
equation (3) are reported in column (1) of Table 2. We observe that the sample firms are
on average concerned with the option value of investment opportunities in making
investment decisions. The estimated coefficient of ‘wait’ has a negative sign and is highly
significant. The test statistic for the absence of first-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals ( 1 m ) is highly significant with a negative sign, indicating that the
disturbances  it e  are not serially correlated. The test of second order serial correlation
( 2 m ) is not significant, confirming no serial correlation in the error term. The Sargan test14
statistic supports the validity of the instruments used in the estimation. The coefficient test
(Wald) rejects at the 5% level the null hypothesis that there is no waiting effect.
Table 2 The effect of waiting on investment: main tests
12 3 4
Wait -0.0161 -0.0239 -0.07589 -0.0769









m1 -2.226 -2.4 -2.654 -2.856
m2 -0.522 -0.595 -0.774 -0.546
Wald test H0 1=0 H0 1=0 H0 1=0 H0 1=0
Chi-square 5.679 5.137 3.878 4.534
H0 2=0 H0 2=0 H0 2=0
0.577 3.487 3.977
Sargan(k) 61.483(53) 66.114(150) 66.841(150) 65.946(100)
Instruments waitt-2…t-8 waitt-2…t-8 waitt-2…t-8
waitt-2… wait*liquidt-2…t-8 wait*dept-2…t-8 wait*dept-2…t-8
liquidityt-2…t-8 depreciationt-2…t-8
Notes:
(1) Data source: Jaarboek van Nederlands Ondernemingen
(2) The one-step estimates with robust test statistics are reported
(3) Heterosckedasticity consistent asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses
(4) m1: test of first-order serial correlation15
      m2: test of second-order serial correlation
(5) Sargan(k): test of the overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as Chi-square (k) under
the null
(6) Instrument variables are the observations dated at (t-2) and earlier of the right hand side variables
(7) Explanations of variables:
       K I : the investment to capital ratio
      wait : the difference between observed and threshold values of profits
      proxy : the proxy for irreversibility
      liquidity: the liquid ratio of assets
      depreciation: the rate of depreciation of capital goods
The second column of Table 2 displays the results of estimating equation (4) when the
proxy for irreversibility is asset liquidity. The estimated coefficient of ‘wait’ remains
significant with a negative sign, indicating that the difference between the realizations of
profits and the threshold values of profits indeed depresses investment. The Wald
coefficient test rejects the null at the 5% level. The interesting result concerns the effect of
irreversibility on investment that is conducted via ‘wait’. As we can see that the estimated
coefficient of the interactive term is positive as we are expecting but it is not significant,
indicating that there is no important association between the delay of investment and asset
liquidity based on our dataset. Tests of the absence of first-order and second-order serial
correlation in the first difference residuals are all satisfactory. The Sargan statistic also
supports the validity of the instruments.
Column (3) and (4) of Table 2 show the system GMM estimation results for equation
(4) when the rate of depreciation of capital goods is used as the proxy for irreversibility.
In the estimation of column (3) the own effect of depreciation is controlled. In column (4)
we do not isolate the own effect of depreciation due to the concern that it is carried by
firm fixed effects. As we see that the results are quite consistent across the two cases. The
estimated waiting effect remains significantly negative. The estimated coefficient of the
interactive term is significant but it has a wrong (positive) sign, indicating that the speed
of depreciation affects investment but not through the restriction of irreversibility.
To summarize the evidence we found so far, the sample firms are on average
concerned with the opportunity costs of excising investment options. Using asset liquidity
and the speed of depreciation as indirect proxies for irreversibility to check the
association between the delay of investment and the restriction of irreversibility, we find
that neither asset liquidity nor depreciation policies are important factors that cause firms
to wait to invest.16
5.2 Robustness checks
To check the robustness of the system GMM estimates obtained from estimating the
reduced investment equation, we further control the growth opportunity of the firm in the
investment equation and repeat the estimations. The growth opportunity of the firm is
approximated by the growth rate of sales. The results are reported in Table 3. As shown
by the first row of Table 3, the estimated coefficient of the growth rate of sales is
significant with the positive sign in three out of four cases, basically confirming the
accelerator effect. The estimated waiting effect remains significantly negative in all cases.
All coefficient test statistics are satisfactory. The estimated interaction between ‘wait’ and
the rate of depreciation is significant but again with the positive sign. This result implies
that the higher the rate of depreciation, the severer the waiting effect, which again
suggests that the mechanism through which the depreciation policy affects investment is
not the restriction of irreversibility. On the other hand, as we found in Table 2 assets
liquidity does not interact with ‘wait’.
The results reported in Table 2 and Table 3 are based on the profit threshold that is
constructed by approximating the expected distribution of profits using the whole
historical movement of profits. Since this is only one of the ways of modeling the future
development of a stochastic process using historical data, the results might be sensitive to
the choice of the modeling method. As another robustness check, we approximate the
expected distribution of profits by using a window of fixed length (5-year historical
data). An alternative profit threshold series is constructed for each firm. We calculate the
5-year moving average of the growth rate of profits and dated it in the fifth year as the
drift of the profit process for that year. We use the 5-year moving variance of the growth
rate of profit as the variance of the profit process for the fifth year. The same risk-
adjusted discount rate of the firm is used in constructing the alternative threshold value of
profits. Using the alternative threshold to redefine the variable ‘wait’, we repeat all
estimations of Table 2 and Table 3. The results are highly consistent with what we
obtained in both Table 2 and Table 3.
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Table 3 The effect of waiting on investment: robustness tests
12 3 4
S
g 0.1983 0.1522 0.1467 0.1554
<1.8298> <1.7341> <1.5699> <1.9874>
Wait -0.0181 -0.0209 -0.0674 -0.0776









m1 -1.987 -2.085 -2.187 -2.516
m2 -1.076 -1.011 -1.215 -1.022
Wald test H0 1=0 H0 1=0 H0 1=0 H0 1=0
Chi-square 5.329 6.302 4.265 4.147
H0 2=0 H0 2=0 H0 2=0
0.586 3.936 3.677










t-2… waitt-2…t-4 waitt-2…t-4 waitt-2…t-8
waitt-2… wait*liquidt-2…t-4 wait*dept-2…t-4 wait*dept-2…t-8
liquidityt-2…t-4 depreciationt-2…t-4
Notes: see notes for Table 218
5.3 Additional Explanations
The system GMM estimates in general do not support the relevance of our proxies of
irreversibility to the delay of firm investment. The irrelevance of irreversibility to the
delay of investment might be explained by the lack of appropriateness of our proxy
variables or some special characteristics of the sample firms. First of all, many of the
sample firms are multinational corporations. They operate on international markets and
their assets are relatively diversified with respect to both operating locations and types of
assets. Lang and Stulz (1994) document that a firm becomes more diversified as its
number of segments increases. Since diversified firms are more likely than specialized
firms to have substantial assets that can be easily sold due to the fact that they can sell
non-core segments, diversification obviously reduces the restriction of irreversibility (also
see Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 1999). Secondly, the sample firms are all
large listed firms in the Netherlands, they have few problems in accessing to external
capital markets and the asymmetric information (lemons) problem is less sever for these
firms. Therefore transaction costs relating to reselling capital goods are relatively low.
Finally, capital markets are well developed in the Netherlands, which probably mitigates
the restriction of irreversibility on firm investment in general. If irreversibility is not such
an effective factor that drives firms to wait to invest, then the existence of the investment
waiting behavior suggests that the sample firms enjoy timing flexibility in arranging their
investment. It is therefore more likely that imperfect competition is responsible for the
higher investment hurdles confronted by the sample firms. Other studies indeed find
evidence of monopolistic competition of Dutch firms (see Van Ees, Garretsen, De Haan,
and Sterken, 1998).
To further explain the waiting effect, we need the data on market power for the
sample firms, which is not available in the data set we used in the previous estimations.
To obtain an indicator of market power, we use another data set, namely AMADEUS. The
profit margin is chosen as the indicator of market power. In AMADEUS, the profit margin
is constructed as the ratio of operating profit before taxation to operating revenue
(turnover). Among the original 77 sample firms, there are 16 firms that either have no
data on the profit margin or the data is not continuous over at least 5 years. So that we are
left with 61 sample firms in this set of estimations. Since AMADEUS only reports 5-year
continuous observations, we select the data of the profit margin over the period of 1994-
1999. Some of the sample firms have data on the profit margin from 1994-1998. Others19
have the observations from 1995-1999. We calculate the average value of the profit
margin for the 61 sample firms over continuous 5-year observations. Then we define a
dummy variable  1 = i pm  if firm i  has the average value of the profit margin which is
above the median of the whole (61) sample firms.  0 = i pm  if firm i ’s average profit
margin is below the sample median. The sample median is 5.2577.
9 The following
investment equation is then estimated by using the system GMM procedure:
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Where the coefficient of  4 a  captures the effect of ‘wait’ on the investment decision of
the firms that have relatively higher market power, while  5 a  captures the effect of ‘wait’
on the investment decisions of the firms that have lower market power. u  is the error
term.  If it is market power (timing flexibility) that explains the waiting behavior of the
sample firms, then we would expect  4 a  and  5 a  to be different. The estimated value of
4 a  should be larger in the absolute value than that of  5 a . The higher the market power
the more timing flexibility of the firm. The firm is more likely to wait to invest if it has
greater timing flexibility with respect to when to undertake investment. Therefore a lower
investment ratio is expected. All other variables in (5) are defined in the same way as in
the previous estimations of this paper. The estimated values of  4 a  and  5 a  are expected
to be negative as before. To be consistent with the former estimation of Table 3, we also
estimate equation (6), in which the growth opportunity of the firm is controlled. Here the
growth of sales is redefined by using the dummy variable pm.





æ pm wait pm wait f f
K
I
it it t i
it





it pm S pm S V a a + - + + ) 1 ( * * 7 6 (6)20
where 
g
it S  indicates the growth rate of sales for firm i at time t . V  is the error term.  6 a
and  7 a  are parameters. Table 4 displays the system GMM results of the impact of market
power on the waiting effect.














m1 -2.072 -2.115 -1.836
m2 -0.626 -0.727 -1.221
Wald test H0 1=0 H0 4=0 H0 4=0
Chi-square 5.003 13.826 9.165
H0 5=0 H0 5=0
3.089 3.326
Sargan(k) 52.352(50) 48.345(100) 48.567(128)
Instruments (t-2)…(t-8) (t-2)…(t-4)
waitt-2…t-8 all regressors all regressors
Notes: see notes for Table 2  pm :dummy variable indicating profit margin21
Using the 61 firms, we re-estimate equation (3) to check the robustness of the results
in the first column of Table 2.  The first column of Table 4 shows that the estimated
waiting effect is closely consistent with the former results. Column (2) of Table 4 reports
the results for estimating (5) and column (3) of Table 4 shows the results of estimating
(6). As shown by column (2) and (3) of Table 4, the estimated waiting effect is more
severer for the firms that have relatively higher profit margin, while the firms that have
lower market power experience modest waiting behavior. The Wald test statistic shows
that the estimated coefficient of ‘wait’ for the firms that have lower profit margin is
significantly different from zero only at the 10% level in both column (2) and (3) of Table
4, while the Wald test statistics is highly significant (at 0.1% and 1% levels, respectively)
for the firms that have higher profit margin. Moreover, the estimated waiting effect for
high market power firms is much stronger as compared with the results shown by column
(1) of Table 2 and column (1) of Table 3. These results indicate that market power indeed
enforces the waiting effect. These results lend a strong support to the notion that
imperfect competition or market power explains why the sample firms on average are
confronted with higher investment hurdles. The evidence shows that the market power
enjoyed by the sample firms provides them with timing flexibility with respect to when to
undertake their investment.
6. Conclusions
The paper tests a standard real options model of investment using an unbalanced panel of
77 listed Dutch manufacturing firms during 1984-1997. The application of firm-level data
(rather than at project-or plant-level) to the real options model of investment is scant in
the literature. This study attempts to make a contribution to this field.
We assume that the managers of the firm act in accordance with the real options
theory of investment. By first modeling the future development of profits based on the
historical movement of the profit process, we are able to construct the option value
multiplier under the assumption of the risk-averse attitude of the firm. After that the profit
threshold value is approximated based on the structure of a standard real options model of
investment (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Special attention is paid to whether the difference
between the actual value and the threshold value of profits affects firm investment.22
Moreover, we check the role played by irreversibility in causing firms to wait to invest by
employing two indirect proxies for the restriction of irreversibility.
The system GMM estimates support the basic prediction of the real options theory of
investment. The sample firms are found to care about the opportunity costs of exercising
investment options. The difference between the observed profits and the threshold values
of profits (wait) is consistently found to depress firm investment, implying that the
sample firms on average intend to wait until the actual value of profits hits its threshold
level. Nevertheless, there is no convincing evidence that shows that asset liquidity and
depreciation policies can explain the waiting behavior of the sample firms, suggesting
that irreversibility is probably not an important concern for the sample firms to postpone
investment. This may be explained by the fact that we do not have access to the
information directly related to the secondary markets for capital goods, which makes the
two indirect proxies for irreversibility less informative. On the other hand if these proxies
indeed reveal some information on the restriction of irreversibility, the result lends a
support to the notion that irreversibility alone does not always depress investment. Some
characteristics of the sample firms might be important in explaining the irrelevance of the
restriction of irreversibility. Financial markets are well developed in the Dutch economy,
which mitigates the restriction of irreversibility on firm investment in general. In
addition, the sample firms are all large listed firms in the Netherlands. The asymmetric
information (lemons) problem is less severe for them and they have easier accesses to
external capital markets. These factors are expected to narrow the wedge between
purchasing and reselling prices of capital goods for the sample firms. Moreover, many of
the sample firms are multinational corporations. They operate on international markets
and the assets owned by these firms are relatively diversified with respect to both
operating locations and types of assets. Diversification is also expected to reduce the
restriction of irreversibility. If irreversibility is not an effective factor that drives firms to
wait, then imperfect competition might be responsible for higher investment hurdles
confronted by the sample firms. Further evidence indeed shows that higher market power
is associated with severer waiting effects, indicating that it is imperfect competition or
market power that provides the sample firms with timing flexibility with respect to when
to undertake investment.23
Appendix A: The derivation of the investment model
The investment model we derive here is based on the standard real option model of
investment (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). A risk-averse firm decides whether to start a new
capital investment project in the current year. Suppose that the value of the firm is the
expected value of the profit stream that is generated by the new capital. The profit process









Where p is the profit generated by the investment.  dz is the incremental of a standard
Wiener process, with  []0 = E dz , and  () [ ]dt dz = E
2 .  p m  is the drift and  p s is the
standard deviation of profit. The value of the firm fluctuates with the changes in profits.
Suppose that the firm has the option to postpone the current investment. In this case the
investment outlay is saved. If the firm decides to invest right now, the value of the firm
will be the discounted present value of future profits generated from the investment. We
denote the expected value of the firm if it invests now as  ) (p now V , then:









Where   t p  is the profit of the firm at time t . E is the expectation operator. r  is the risk-
adjusted discount rate of the firm. We assume  p m r >  to be consistent with the standard
real option model of investment.
Solving equation (A2) and noticing that  ()
t e
p m p p= E  because of the assumption








This is the discounted present value of the firm if it starts to invest in the current year.
However, if the firm decides to postpone the investment, the present value of the firm is
the value of the investment opportunity. If we denote the present value of the firm in case
of waiting as  ) (p wait V , it needs to satisfy the Bellman equation:
() [] p p r wait wait dV dt V E = ) (
(A4)
As widely documented in the literature (MacDonald and Siegel, 1986; Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994), by Ito’s Lemma and using (A1), we can solve for  () [] p wait dV E  and (A4)
becomes:
() () () 0
2
1 2 2 = - ¢ + ² p r p p m p p s p p wait wait wait V V V (A5)
Where  () () p p ² ¢
wait wait V V , are the first and the second order derivatives of the value of
the firm with respect to profits, respectively. The solution to the differential equation (A5)






As widely proved in the literature, the solution is:25
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To solve the threshold level of profits, both the value matching and smooth pasting
conditions have to be satisfied:
() () IC V V now wait - =




* * ¢ = ¢ p p now wait V V
(A10)
Where  IC represents the investment cost. The value matching condition (A9) states that
at optimal the firm is indifferent between investing right now and delaying the
investment. The smooth pasting condition (A10) guarantees that the value function of the
firm is continuous at the threshold value of profit (
* p ) if 
* p  maximizes the value of the
firm. We will measure the cost of investment by the observable gross fixed investment
undertaken by the firm at time t . By the value matching condition,
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Solving equation (A11) and (A12) simultaneously, we have:









Equation (A13) is the threshold level of profits. 
1 - b
b
is the so called ‘option value
multiplier’.27
Appendix B: Data Description
(1) The main data used in this paper is taken from the publication of Jaarboek van
Nederlandse Ondernemingen. The 77 manufacturing firms in the data set are listed on the
Amsterdam stock exchange (AEX) over the period of 1984–1997 in the Dutch economy.
In this data set:
Gross Investment = capital goods investment, which is the sum of the changes in the
capital stock and the depreciation of the capital stock.
Capital Stock = the book value of the capital stock.
Profit = operating profits after tax and before interest payments.
Payout Ratio = the ratio of dividend per share to net profit per share.
Depreciation Rate = the ratio of the depreciation of the capital stock to the beginning-of-
year capital stock.
Liquid ratio = the ratio of liquid assets to the capital stock.
Sales = the product of the output price and the amount of product sold.
(2) The data on profit margin is downloaded from AMEDEUS online information service.
Among the 77 Dutch listed firms in the data set (1), there are 61 firms that have
continuous 5-year observations of profit margin over the period of 1994-1995 in
AMEDEUS. The construction of profit margin is:
profit margin (%) = (operating profit before taxation/operating revenue(turnover) )*10028
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Endnotes
                                                          
1 Irreversibility implies that once capital goods are purchased the reselling prices are lower than
their purchasing prices. A broader view of irreversibility means that revising investment decisions
is always costly.
2 Caballerro (1991) deals with the case of product markets, in which the source of uncertainty is
from product market conditions, such as the output price, and the demand faced by the firm. Under
these circumstances, the assumptions of imperfect competition and/or decreasing returns to scale
are important since they ensure that the value function of the firm is concave in capital.
3 See Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Chapter 5.
4 If this assumption does not hold, the firm will never invest since waiting is always better than
investing.
5 For a storable commodity, convenience yield represents the net marginal convenience yield from
storage. It is the flow of benefits (less storage costs) that the marginal stored unit provides. See
Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Chapter 6, pp179.
6 The profit series starts from 1984 in our dataset, so the series of the growth rate of profit starts
from 1985.
7 We have to drop some observations that have the value of b less than or equal one to be
consistent with the theory. The total firm-year observation left is 754 in final estimations.
8 To save space we do not formally report this set of estimation results. They are available on
request.
9 The mean value of average profit margin of these 61 firms is 5.9179. The median is 5.2577.
Standard deviation is 4.3851, Skewness is –0.4032 and Kurtosis is 4.6238.